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Abstract 
In theory, an ADSL router can provide an additional layer of security to a wired 
and wireless network through; access control, wireless encryption, firewall rule 
sets, and network event logging. An ADSL router may also contain the users’ 
usage habits and broadband account credentials. However, end-users may be 
unaware of the intricacies of the security measures available and the potentially 
confidential information stored on their device. As a result a second hand ADSL 
router may contain a wealth of user-specific information if not wiped and 
disposed of in a secure manner. 
This paper shows the data that was acquired from a selection of second hand 
ADSL routers purchased during the first quarter of 2011. From the data acquired 
and analysed, individuals are not removing their personally identifiable 
information and are leaving confidential data which may lead to detrimental 
outcomes if misused. The paper also shows that end-user applied security on these 
devices was alarmingly low. Thus many consumers may fall victim to new and 
emergent Internet based crimes if the full security capabilities of their ADSL 
router are not applied. 
Keywords: ADSL router forensics, broadband router, data recovery, remnant 
data  
1. INTRODUCTION 
As of December, 2010 the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2010) reported 
that there are over ten million active Internet connections in Australia. The ABS 
figures state that over nine million of these connections are non-dialup (ABS, 
2010). The number of active broadband connections will gradually increase with 
the implementation of an Australian Government initiative the National 
Broadband Network – replacing existing copper communication lines with fibre 
optics. This is set to provide consumers and businesses with high-speed 
broadband access to ninety-three percent of Australia’s population (Australian 
Government, 2011). 
ADSL router manufactures and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) sell the ADSL 
routers preconfigured thus eliminating the tedious and confusing configuration 
process faced by novice users. This allows consumers to connect to the Internet in 
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a streamlined (“hassle-free setup”) manner (Westnet, 2011). ADSL routers have 
two sets of authentication credentials. The first set of credentials includes the 
username and password used to access the broadband service provided by the 
ISP. The second set of credentials is utilized to access and configure the ADSL 
router. Australian ISPs may dispatch or professionally install ADSL routers and 
configure the ADSL router on behalf of the customer (Bigpond, 2011). Vendors 
on the other hand populate network or modulation settings in a manner which 
allows the device to be used directly out of the box. For instance, this may include 
enabling the wireless access point without any security such as Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), or setting the most common 
modulation settings for the region of use. Collectively this is eliminating the 
difficulties faced by novice computer users to access their network and the 
Internet. Consequently, if end-users are not exposed to the product literature or 
never configure the ADSL router themselves, then they may be unaware of its 
functionality and the specific personal and confidential data stored persistently on 
the device. This assumption is reinforced through a 2009 survey (Szewczyk & 
Furnell, 2009), whereby a respondent purchased a non-wireless based ADSL 
router as they were unaware that the wireless feature could be switched off. 
A large focus of current research is centred around remanent data on hard disks, 
USB drives and gaming consoles sold through second hand auction websites 
(Jones, Valli, & Dabibi, 2009; Valli & Woodward, 2008; Xynos, Harries, 
Sutherland, Davies, & Blyth, 2010). This previous research has identified a 
continuous trend in sellers leaving confidential data on the devices intact. In a few 
rare occurrences sellers format the storage media, but do not use an appropriate 
method by which to wipe or destroy the data permanently (Jones, et al., 2009). 
An ADSL router when compared to a modern computer system contains limited 
volatile and non-volatile storage. Any specific user activities such as browsing 
habits are stored in the volatile Random Access Memory (RAM). The device is 
disconnected from the wall power outlet during the sale process and as a result 
volatile data is lost and cannot be retrieved at a later date. However, the ADSL 
router’s non-volatile storage contains account authentication credentials, pre-
configured data for accessing remote network services and security settings. In 
addition had the device been compromised through malware specimens inclusive 
of psyb0t or the Chuck Norris Botnet (Bridges, 2008; Symantec, 2009) this would 
result in static changes to the configuration data which will remain present in non-
volatile storage when the device is powered down (Čeleda, Krejčí, Vykopal, & 
Drašar, 2010). 
The discipline of ADSL router forensics and data acquisition from these devices 
still remains in its infancy. Unlike a hard disk or a USB storage device, there is 
limited storage space available to store confidential information. In most instances 
the persistent storage capacity of an ADSL router will range from 1-8MiB. 
However, this is not to say that interest in the area is not growing. Recently the 
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United States National Institute of Justice developed the first commercial ADSL 
router forensics software namely Router Marshal (ATC-NY, 2010). Router 
Marshal whilst mimicking the author’s procedures and methods used in this 
paper, is only available to a subset of law enforcement agencies in the United 
States of America upon a special request. 
2. ADSL ROUTER INVESTIGATION 
To gain a perspective of the level of sensitive information, and the security state 
of the second hand devices, a series of questions were formulated. The first 
question "Do second hand ADSL routers contain user specific information?" was 
centred on discovering whether or not an end-user would sell a device with user-
specific information intact. No incentives or explanations detailing how or why to 
remove personal information currently exist. As a result it is expected that the 
devices will contain confidential data overlooked by the seller prior to shipping. 
The second question "Are second hand ADSL routers utilizing a recent firmware 
image?" is based on the prevalent threat of end-users not updating their firmware. 
This may result in the device being susceptible to emergent malware specimens 
which exploit the vulnerabilities of the operating system (Baume, 2009; Čeleda, et 
al., 2010). End-users may continue utilizing the default firmware on the ADSL 
router that was present when the device was purchased. Alternatively, an end-user 
who is aware of the reason for updating the firmware and understands the 
procedure may then update the firmware.  
Implementing effective security controls and safeguards onto a workstation is a 
complicated task for many individuals due to the usability constraints of security 
software (Ibrahim, Furnell, Papadaki, & Clarke, 2010). An ADSL router has the 
capability of providing various layers of defence. Specifically, the device can 
incorporate numerous wireless encryption protocols, denial of service prevention 
through firewall rule sets, and network logging for review or analysis of network 
events. In addition, the device can be configured to filter traffic according to 
internal or external IP addresses and ports, or specific Uniform Resource Locators 
(URLs). As a result the third question "To what extent is the ADSL router 
secured?" is aimed at identifying what security approaches end-users utilize on 
their device. 
The author’s research to date, has predominantly focused on the development of a 
sound approach into acquiring data of interest from Australian based ADSL 
routers (Szewczyk, 2009a, 2009b). Subsequently, this same approach and 
specifically the SSH and Serial Console methods were utilized in this experiment. 
As each device was purchased and received, it was then disassembled to view and 
determine which connection point would be utilized to acquire data. The 
connection point deemed appropriate was chosen based upon accessibility and the 
feasibility of soldering on a pin header without unnecessarily damaging the 
device. The appropriate cable (Szewczyk, 2009b) was subsequently attached to 
each ADSL router and a series of command line arguments and software were 
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initiated to begin the transfer of data to a host workstation. The subsequent images 
which were extracted from each device were carved using a hexadecimal editor as 
per the method demonstrated by Szewczyk (2009a). The resultant ADSL router 
image is viewed via an XML style sheet for simple data interpretation. 
Each device was purchased from the second hand auction site - eBay Australia. 
For the purpose of this research a second hand ADSL router constitutes a device 
in which the seller on eBay claims that it has been used previously. This was 
undertaken by narrowing down eBay results according to the condition category 
of either used or refurbished. The selection of ADSL routers was biased in that 
purchases were made over a thirty day period (January through to February, 2011) 
and limited to the home or small business array of devices. This approach was 
selected in that a subsequent study would be undertaken on the high-end range of 
ADSL routers which contained server and multimedia capabilities at a later date. 
An initial outcome of the study was the lack of ADSL routers available on the 
second hand auction site eBay. The price of many ADSL routers has decreased 
over the years and consumers are now able to purchase devices with newer and 
advanced features such as the inclusion of 802.11n Wi-Fi or an inbuilt media 
server (D-Link, 2011). As a result there appears to be little incentive for an 
individual to purchase a second hand device which could be deterring sellers from 
auctioning their used device on eBay. Over the thirty day period it was evident 
that D-Link and Netgear were the predominant ADSL routers available. This 
could be influenced by many Australian retail outlets predominantly selling these 
brands. At the conclusion of the purchasing period, a total of twenty-three devices 
were obtained from the manufactures; D-Link, Netgear, and 2Wire (which is sold 
by Australia’s ISP – Bigpond. Table 1 in the discussion section lists the make and 
model of the devices purchased. 
3. RESEARCH RESULTS 
The following data presents the findings for the study of twenty-three ADSL 
routers obtained from second hand auction site. Data could be successfully 
acquired from twenty-two devices corresponding to a ninety-six percent success 
rate. One ADSL router was damaged. This was known to the researcher upon the 
time of sale. However, an attempt to recover data was still made although 
unsuccessful. After a careful examination it appeared that the device had suffered 
an electrical shock resulting in various capacitors and memory chips being 
damaged. 
Two of the twenty-three devices had been reset to their factory default state 
(presumably by the seller) resulting in no individual data being available to 
extract and analyse. Factory resetting the device can be achieved by loading the 
default vendor configuration values via a script obtainable through the vendor 
website. Alternatively, the user may physically reset the device by the switch 
located at the back of the device. This results in the configuration partition of non-
volatile flash memory being overwritten with the vendor default values – located 
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in a separate flash partition (OpenWRT, 2010). 
Three of the ADSL routers had partial data removed. In this instance the 
broadband authentication credentials consisting of the username and password 
could not be located. Upon investigation it appeared that the seller or previous 
owner may have manually deleted the data, and permanently committed the 
changes to non-volatile storage. 
Fifteen of the ADSL routers had all their data intact. In these specific instances 
broadband authentication credentials and resultant passwords were still present. In 
addition, nine of these fifteen devices (sixty percent) incorporated a wireless 
access point, in which all wireless related information was present.  
Two of the ADSL routers were non acquirable due to access point constraints. In 
this instance the D-Link DSL-200 device does not encompass on chip access 
points to acquire data from the device. An invasive HTTP approach was utilized, 
although the devices had been password protected. The process of factory 
resetting the device was used which permitted the default username and password 
to be used, granting access to the device. Figure 1 presents an overview of the 
devices which were acquirable and had recoverable data pertinent to this study. 
 
Figure 1 Percentage comparison of obtainable information 
 
There is insufficient data to develop definitive trends and draw conclusions. 
However, from the sample examined it does appear that individuals and 
commercial entities are selling ADSL routers with information that would be 
misused if made available to the wrong parties. In three instances it was identified 
that the owner had logged into the device and manually removed broadband 
authentication credentials. 
A depiction of data which appeared more prominent from a security perspective 
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has been presented below: 
• Two devices, specifically the D-Link DSL-2730 had its 
firmware updated to the latest July, 2010 version. In the worst 
instance, one device (Netgear DG834g) was using firmware 
from 2006 even though significant updates had been made 
available from the manufacturer’s website. The remaining 
nineteen devices were utilizing firmware from either 2007 or 
2008. 
• Fifteen devices had their broadband service credentials 
present. It could be possible that the seller altered or used 
fictitious data prior to selling the device. However, in each 
instance the username was in the format of 
username@isp.com.au or username@isp.net.au and clearly 
reflected an Australian based ISP. This was further coupled 
with the password associated with the broadband service 
which was available in clear text.  
• One device had its device access authentication credentials 
strengthened. In this instance the password selected was eleven 
characters long and made up of alphanumeric characters. The 
remaining devices were using the default usernames and 
passwords implemented by the manufacturer.  
• One device had its firewall disabled with specific rule sets de-
selected. Two of the devices namely the D-Link DSL-200 do 
not encompass any firewall blocking feature. 
• Four ADSL routers had the name of a business used as the 
SSID which was further validated as a business via the World 
Wide Web (WWW). The SSID had a similar name to the 
username used as part of the credentials required to access the 
broadband service. In addition the business premises clearly 
resided in the Australian state the product was sold from.  
• Nine devices had a wireless access point which was enabled. 
One device was utilizing WPA security and Media Access 
Control (MAC) filtering. Two devices were using WEP. The 
remaining six devices had an open connection.  
• The peer-to-peer file sharing protocol BitTorrent was a 
common trait amongst eleven devices. This was evident 
through the rule sets and ports mimicking torrent clients. Two 
devices had Remote Management enabled to a predefined 
Internet Protocol (IP) address. Specifically Web and Telnet 
were selected. 
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• Two of the business based devices were utilizing Dynamic 
Domain Name System (DynDNS). In each instance the user 
configuration data consisting of account username and 
password were clearly intact and acquirable from the device. 
• Twenty ADSL routers encompassed the network logging and 
notification feature. However, none of these devices had any 
of these features enabled. 
Table 1 depicts an overall summary of the devices utilized in the study, and the 
corresponding points of interest that were notable amongst the data that was 
analysed. The areas shaded represents devices which did not encompass a 
wireless access point and resultantly do not apply to the categories used. 
Table 1 ADSL Router Information of Interest 
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D-Link DSL-2730B D  D D  D   
D-Link DSL-2730B  D D D  D 1  
D-Link DSL-G604T D D  D D D 2  
D-Link DSL-G604T D D  D  D   
D-Link DSL-G604T D D    D   
D-Link DSL-G604T D D  D  D   
Netgear DG834g D D  D  D 2  
Netgear DG834g D D  D  D   
Netgear DG834g D D  D  D   
D-Link DSL-504T D D  D D    
D-Link DSL-504T D D  D     
D-Link DSL-504T D D  D     
D-Link DSL-502 D D  D     
D-Link DSL-502  D  D     
D-Link DSL-302 D D  D     
Netgear DG834 D D  D D    
Netgear DG834 D D  D     
Netgear DG834  D  D     
Netgear DG834  D  D     
2Wire 2071-A   D  D     
2Wire 2071-A  D  D     
D-Link DSL-200         
D-Link DSL-200         
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4. DISCUSSION 
In 2008, it was identified that the number of second hand disks being securely 
wiped was marginally increasing compared to previous years (Valli & 
Woodward, 2008). This could be due to the publicity and media coverage 
(Moscaritolo, 2010) given to individuals who dispose of magnetic media in an 
insecure manner. Furthermore, there is a significant array of commercial and 
freely available tools to securely wipe hard disks (Caloyannides, 2009). As a 
result, an end-user does have means by which to eliminate confidential data 
should they wish to do so.  
From a mobile phone perspective, second hand auction sites continue 
emphasising to sellers that personal data should be removed from their electronic 
device prior to shipping the item (eBay, 2011). This process works as an 
education and awareness approach, and in-turn, individuals are at the very least 
informed of the possibility of someone obtaining their confidential information. 
Similar information and tutorials can be obtained by end-users who search the 
Internet as to how to prepare a mobile phone or similar electronic devices prior to 
sale and in-turn can follow step-by-step procedures. Tools which can erase data 
from hard disks are not compatible with ADSL routers. Subsequently, there are 
currently no specifically made tools by which to quickly and easily erase data 
securely from ADSL routers. Furthermore, search engines do not currently yield 
any supportive information or instruction on the topic. 
4.1 User Specific Information 
In answering the first question in this study, ADSL routers do contain user 
specific information. One of the main results from this investigation is associated 
with broadband authentication credentials remaining on the device after a sale. 
The value of a password is high in that end-users often recycle passwords for 
numerous accounts (Notoatmodjo & Thomborson, 2009) and rarely change their 
online passwords (Hart, 2008). This creates two significant issues. Firstly, having 
acquired this data, an individual with malicious intent could misuse the broadband 
account and its associated features. More importantly, this data can be utilized to 
access the broadband account through the respective online portal. Broadband 
accounts are usually populated with a wealth of user related information. This 
may include the owner’s name, an address, but more crucially direct debit and 
credit card information. 
In two of the devices obtained, the data shows that the entity previously utilizing 
the device was in fact an organisation. This was evident through the SSID which 
clearly contained the name of the company. Furthermore, the broadband 
authentication credentials (username and password) coincided with SSID. 
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4.2 Firmware Currency 
The second research question dealt with the currency of the firmware on the 
ADSL router. The outdated firmware on many of the devices can be problematic 
for end-users. Many ADSL routers can be exploited as a result of vulnerabilities 
in the operating system. For instance the first generation Netcomm routers 
encompassed an operating system flaw by which an individual who had 
administrator privileges could remotely access the device (Baume, 2009; Bridges, 
2008). The firmware was severely outdated on all but two of the devices used in 
this study.  
A potential reason for the lack of firmware updates could be a result of no actual 
enforcement to the end-user. On a Microsoft Windows workstation the end-user 
may configure how updates are downloaded and installed for the operating 
system. The default option being for any available updates to be automatically 
downloaded and installed, although the end-user may also disable this entirely 
(Gerace & Cavusoglu, 2009). Such a feature is not available on current ADSL 
routers. In addition, manufacturers have not implemented a means by which to 
inform users that a critical firmware update has been made available. 
The issue of ensuring end-users update their firmware can be rectified in a simple 
manner. The manufacturer Quality Network Appliance Provider (QNAP) 
incorporates a feature within its devices which notifies the end-user when a 
firmware update is available. This is achieved via a notification window when the 
end-user logs in to configure the device. However, many end-users may follow a 
"setup-and-forget" approach meaning there is no reason to access the 
configuration options on a regular basis. However, QNAP also developed a 
solution for this issue via the QNAP Finder (QNAP, 2011). The QNAP Finder is 
a Windows application that allows an end-user to quickly check and apply any 
firmware update that becomes available. Similar processes can be applied to 
ADSL routers which in-turn would safeguard end-users confidential information, 
and prevent the device from being compromised due to existing vulnerabilities. 
4.3 ADSL Router Security 
Changing the default username and password utilized to access the ADSL router 
would seem obvious and a simple security solution. However, an end-user would 
need to be informed of the process and aware of the reason of doing so. Malware 
such as psyb0t is specifically exploiting devices which utilize default vendor 
based usernames and passwords (Baume, 2009; Symantec, 2009).  
Based on the results from this study, end-users are failing to make their devices 
secure. This may be associated with product literature supplied with ADSL 
routers that does not adequately encourage or provide information on how end-
users should change the default settings (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009). Based on the 
results of this study alone it would appear that vendors must take greater initiative 
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to promote and encourage end-users to secure their devices. In-turn consumers 
must also be responsible for proactively identifying the available security methods 
for their device and applying these when and where appropriate. 
Of all security settings present on the devices, it was expected that wireless 
networking would at the very minimum incorporate secure protocols. Television 
and print media have continued to report on wireless threats and promoted good 
wireless security practices (Seymour, 2010; Sinclair, 2010). As a result, it was 
anticipated the devices sold would be at the very least use some form of wireless 
security with a larger emphasis on WPA which is more secure than WEP 
(Lashkari, Mansoor, & Danesh, 2009). This was not the case. Most wireless 
access points were utilizing an unprotected open based connection which is 
usually the default settings on many ADSL routers. 
4.4 Secure Disposal Strategies 
Education and awareness of remanent data of electronic media must be addressed. 
Deciding who specifically is responsible for informing end-users about security 
and proper disposal of data is a separate and debatable issue beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, as newer networking devices incorporate a much more 
sophisticated array of features then similar issues may arise as are common with 
the disposal of hard drives. The D-Link DIR-685 for instance incorporates; a four 
port switch, a wireless access point, network attached storage, multimedia sharing 
capabilities, printer and media server (D-Link, 2011). In-turn such advanced 
functionality will permit different forms of data of interest to be acquired and 
subsequently used in a court of law. 
A solution to mitigate the issue of end-users disposing of their ADSL router with 
confidential data intact would be for the news and media to continually highlight 
the security risks of selling of alternative electronic products. The same ongoing 
approaches (Moscaritolo, 2010) used to show what is being thrown out on hard 
disks and USB drives, could also be applied to ADSL routers thus raising 
awareness amongst ignorant end-users. 
The second hand auction site eBay could take greater initiative to educate and 
make end-users aware of the privacy risks associated with selling electronic 
products. Currently eBay provides warnings to end-users whom sell devices such 
as mobile phones or computers (eBay, 2011). In these warnings end-users are 
instructed to remove personal and confidential information before shipping the 
item. However, in 2011, eBay Australia does not provide any warning or 
notification about removing private data when listing an ADSL router for sale. 
Incorporating clear notifications could prove highly successful. End-users could 
be deterred from selling their second hand ADSL router knowing that there is a 
possibility that personal data could be extracted.  
To date each vendor releases a configuration quick start guide and a detailed 
manual. Although neither meets any specific standard (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009) 
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it does seem that vendors should be encouraged to release security guides. Briefly 
detailing potential attacks and simple solutions may not only make consumers 
aware, but could also be utilized to showcase the security features of the device 
itself. Further education should be provided to end-users. In the manuals supplied 
with the ADSL routers, there is no evidence of the vendors providing details 
regarding how to dispose of the device in a secure manner. 
Restoring factory default settings is a feature hidden away in configuration or 
settings component of ADSL routers. End-users should be further made aware of 
the reason and necessity of utilizing this function. Alternatively, end-users may 
also undertake a hard restore via the reset/restore switch located on the device. 
Unfortunately, this switch is not always accessible with some instances showing 
the switch being located within the actual device post disassembly. 
5. CONCLUSION 
ADSL routers have not yet grown to their full maturity. As consumers continue to 
adopt broadband, the demand for greater functionality shall also increase. As 
shown in this study, it is evident that end-user do sell their ADSL router, with 
plenty of useful information in-tact. As these devices become network media 
centres, the interest in the remanent data may also increase. Education and 
awareness must be provided and emphasised immediately, to prevent these simple 
devices from leaking confidential data into the public realm. 
Future studies will specifically analyse a larger sample size over a twelve month 
period, incorporating both home and small business based ADSL routers, and the 
more high-end multimedia capable devices. This initial study has also identified 
potential projects into exploring approaches that could be utilized to educate end-
users, install firmware updates autonomously, and applying security which meets 
current best practices. 
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